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Financial services within corporations usually are
part of an information system on which many business
functions depend. As of the importance of forecast qual-
ity for financial services, means of forecast accuracy
improvement, such as data–driven statistical prediction
techniques and/or forecast support systems, have been
subject to IS research since decades. In this paper
we consider means of forecast improvement due to
regular patterns in forecast revisioning. We analyze
how business forecasts are adjusted to exploit possible
improvements for the accuracy of forecasts with lower
lead time. The empirical part bases on an unique
dataset of experts’ cash flow forecasts and accountants’
actuals realizations of companies in a global corpo-
ration. We find that direction and magnitude of the
final revision in aggregated forecasts can be related to
suggested targets in earnings management, providing
the means of improving the accuracy of longer–term
cash flow forecasts.
1. Introduction
Corporate financial planning services and subse-
quent management activities in globally operating en-
terprises typically rely on cash flow forecasts within
the financial service center to perform tasks such as
liquidity planning or foreign exchange risk manage-
ment. These forecasts are often generated in a decen-
tralized fashion, where subsidiaries send out thousands
of forecasts to corporate headquarters. These forecasts
are then aggregated and provide the basis for corporate–
wide forecasting and planning tasks, such as liquidity
planning or foreign exchange risk management ([1],
[2], [3], [4], [5], [6]). The understanding of dependen-
cies on forecasts is crucial for a reliable service of the
finance department.
Usually, an initial forecast for a cash flow item is
submitted several months or quarters before the cash
flow’s actual realization date and is then revised over
time to consider novel or changed expectations of ac-
countants. The sequence of initial forecast and adjusted
forecasts is referred to as forecasting process, while
the sequence of revisions is usually coined revisioning
process or simply revisioning. Figure 1 visualizes the
structure of an example five–step forecasting process.
We denote the actual of cash flow item i as A(i) and
t the lead time of a forecast tF (i) for A(i) in time
periods, e.g., quarters, to the actual date (t = 0). The
initial forecast 5F (i) is delivered with a lead time of
five periods and is revised four times until the last one–
period–ahead forecast 1F (i) is generated. Hence, 1F (i)
denotes the one–period ahead forecast for A(i) (i.e., the
last forecast), 2F (i) the two–periods ahead forecast.
Theory suggests that revisioning in efficient fore-
casting processes describes a random walk with zero
correlation amongst revisions or between revision and
error [7]. Non–random walks are expected to lead to
higher error levels for reasons of statistical insufficiency
due to cognitive biases. The application of this theory
(e.g., [8], [9], [10], [11]) provides evidence that cor-
relations are existent in many empirical datasets that
are regularly associated with higher error levels. We
argue that the identification of correlations—maybe at
some aggregation levels or after the transformation of
the raw forecast and actual items—has potentials to
anticipating future adjustments, which might allow for
accuracy improvements at longer forecast horizons.
However, we argue that such useful structures in
revisioning might only be found at particular transfor-
mation and aggregation levels of the data, requiring the
engineering of features from the data. The engineering
of features, i.e., their aggregation, selection, and repre-
sentation, requires a solid understanding and modeling
of business and organizational structures and generally
received scant attention in the IS–related literature so
far ([12], [13], [14], [15]).
In this paper we will analyze whether regular
patterns in the accountants’ revisioning of cash flow



























Figure 1: Temporal structure of cash flow forecasts tF(i) with the corresponding actual cash flow A(i).
forecasts can be exploited to improve the accuracy of
forecasts with higher lead time by considering expected
subsequent adjustments, stated in the up-following re-
search question:
RQ: Is judgmental revisioning in cash flow forecasting
affected by corporate targets or is random walk
behavior identifiable in forecast revisions?
The empirical analyses are based on a unique
dataset of cash flow forecasts and actuals (the cash flow
realizations) of 99 companies of a global corporation.
As feature we consider a subsidiary’s ratio of cash in-
flows and cash outflows cumulated over a fiscal year—a
figure tightly related to a Key Performance Indicator
(KPI) such as Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, De-
preciation, and Amortization (EBITDA). The intuition
is that meeting pre–arranged EBITDA targets is well
incentivized and should therefore pave the way how
cumulated actual ratios will develop over a year, and,
as a consequence, how cash flow forecasts will (have
to be) adjusted later on.
The empirical outcomes show that the direction
and magnitude of the final revision of the aggregated
cash flow forecasts can indeed be explained to a large
extend by the relation between the ratio that results
from current forecasts and a presumed accountants’
earning target. This difference turns out to be a strong
predictor for subsequent revision direction and volume.
The remainder of this paper is structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework.
Section 3 describes our empirical dataset. The design
of our empirical analysis together with our results
is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss
the implications of our work for potential forecast
improvement and rethinking organizational structure.
2. Related work
One of the primary KPI for corporate performance
is the EBITDA [16], which is important in the context
of this paper, because it proxies a company’s current
operating profitability.
Organizational structures and dependencies can
frame corporations and the work of managers – in our
assumption forecasters with planned targets that affect
realizations as well as forecasts and their adjustments
– denoting our expression of an “organizational bias”.
For instance, organizational biases can result by
forecast deviations as pointed out in [17]. They iden-
tified ”dividend thresholds” as an organizational bias.
Within their analyses the organizational bias was re-
lated to the type of firms that are more likely to manage
earnings. Further, [18] identified that firms manage
earnings and managers seem to opportunistically capi-
talize on stock prices that include these manipulated
earnings. In contrast to both of their findings over
many firms on the stock market our paper analyzes
the realizations and forecasts over many subsidiaries
within one single corporation.
In the case of corporate internal forecasts, an
organizational bias might be introduced by earnings
being managed (by shifting actuals) to ensure that KPIs
and planned annual targets are met. These tendencies
to control cash flows by managing earnings are the
result of operations made to ensure meeting specified
targets in organizations ([19], [20]). Cash flow volumes
are influenced by the considerations and motivations of
various business functions; in particular, actuals are of-
ten shifted according to earnings management policies
[21] and management incentives [22]. For instance, if
annual return is expected to be too low, accountant’s
earnings management may result in shifts of cash out-
flow realizations—within the term of credit—forward
to the next fiscal year to meet the appointed targets.
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These targets might be important to humans that
try to achieve personal objectives (e.g., bonus payments
by financial incentives) of predefined targets that rely
on KPI figures, such as Earnings Before Interest and
Taxes (EBIT), which can motivate to alter forecasts and
their adjustments to maximize the personal profit [23].
Another example is stated in [24], where the author
finds managed earnings that managers adjust in re-
sponse to their bonus schemes. When organizational
biases are expected to alter forecast revisions the fore-
cast errors might increase, wherefore the potential of
forecast correction is analyzed in [25]. The authors find
that information of targets is indeed beneficial for the
efficiency of forecasts, as well as for the correction of
whole forecast processes.
Therefore, this paper argues that the organization’s
targets as a personal objective introduces organizational
biases. These organizational biases are expected to
alter forecasts, as they should exhibit the most recent
information for the actual realizations. This argument
will be analyzed on the empirical data from within the
corporation.
3. Available cash flow data
The empirical data we use are a unique record
of cash flow forecasts in the financial system of a
large multinational corporation. The corporation is
headquartered in Germany but has worldwide oper-
ating subsidiaries in different countries. With about
110,000 employees, the company is one of the largest
corporations registered in Germany and generates an-
nual revenues in the medium double–digit billion Euro
range. The corporation has more than 300 separate
legal entities, which include the subsidiaries. The sub-
sidiaries are grouped into three divisions, based on their
portfolios that are fundamentally different in business:
“agricultural products” (AP), “health and pharmaceu-
ticals” (HP), and “industrial materials” (IM). Entities
with business portfolios belonging to more then one
division are summarized under a fourth artificial divi-
sion, “diverse” (DV).
Actuals and forecasts used stem from the corporate
IT system and are available for the 99 largest sub-
sidiaries. These subsidiaries participate in a forecast
process where the local managers of the subsidiaries
provide forecasts for future development and actual
realizations. Delivered quarterly, the forecasts cover
intervals with horizons of up to 15 months (five quar-
ters). The available data range from January 2008 to
December 2013 for actuals and from November 2007
to September 2013 for the corresponding forecasts. The
generated forecasts of a subsidiary cover the subset of
Table 1: Summary of the available cash flow data.
Division Subsidiaries Currencies Actual Series Forecasts
AP 12 16 70 17,010
HP 19 26 146 29,070
IM 13 8 52 13,460
DV 53 37 216 42,820
All 99 44 484 102,360
currencies in which it issues and receives cash flows.
Overall, 44 currencies are part of the dataset. In total,
the raw dataset consists of 20,472 monthly cash flow
actuals, each with five associated forecasts. The data
is considered by the corporate financial controlling
department as the highest reliable data source of the
corporation and is used (after business adjustments for
most recent developments) for the currency hedging of
the corporation. Table 1 gives a brief summary of the
dataset.
4. Empirical analyses
Before we describe the design and results of our
empirical study, we will briefly review the intuition of
the design we use.
We argue that the derived targets are tightly related
to the percentage EBITDA margins of our company.
This assumption is plausible for two reasons. First,
derived EBITDA figures overall result from cash inflow
and outflow. Second, this assumption is underpinned
by the reported percentage EBITDA margin figures in
the annual report, which are in line with the ranks
of division ratios for December values. In the annual
report 2011 the EBITDA margins listed of 22.8 % (AP),
27.4 % (HP), and 10.8 % (IM). Official figures for divi-
sion DV were not reported separately. In 2012, figures
were: 24.0 % (AP), 27.2 % (HP), and 10.9 % (IM). The
figures in 2013 were comparable in magnitude, namely
25.5 % (AP), 28.2 % (HP), and 9.5 % (IM). EBITDA
figures are a primary KPI for corporate performance,
and many corporations incentivize their managers to
meet pre–arranged EBITDA targets.
We will now study whether a subsidiary’s ratio of
cash inflows and cash outflows cumulated over a fiscal
year will drift towards the end–of–year ratios of the
preceding years. The overall intuition is that meeting
pre–arranged EBITDA targets might pave the way how
aggregated actual ratios will develop over a year, and,
as a consequence, how cash flow forecasts will (have
to) be adjusted.
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4.1. Proxy for return margin
Let us introduce some additional notation used in
our analysis. Reconsidering that we denote the actual
of cash flow item i as A(i), and t the lead time of a
forecast tF (i) for i, we use additional subscripts m, y,
and e to denote realization month, realization year, and
the ID of the subsidiary associated with i. Superscript
g denotes the type of the actual (g ∈ {cash inflow
(CI), cash outflow (CO)}). Therefore, the indexation
of an actual is in maximum Age,y,m(i). If an index is
irrelevant or obvious in the context, we will omit to
write the respective index for reasons of brevity.
For our return-related analyses at the organiza-
tional level, we require abstraction from the raw cash
flow data in form of an aggregated perspective on cash
inflows and cash outflows. As a proxy for percentage
return within a fiscal year for a specific subsidiary e, we
use the computed ratio R of aggregated cash inflows
and cash outflows in the M -th month of a year Y











For instance, R22010,12 refers to the ratio of all cash
flows from October to December 2010. We omit the
superscript K if K = M − 1 and denote R(AY,M )
as the ratio aggregating all realized cash flows in year
y = Y up to (and including) month m = M . As with
individual actuals and forecasts, we use F instead of A
when referring to ratios computed over forecasts. Since
ratios are specific for an subsidiary e, for reasons of
comparability we compute normalized ratios Rn, with
values between zero and one per subsidiary. Normal-
ized ratios are obtained by subtracting the minimum
ratio within an subsidiary from R and dividing by the
difference of its maximum and minimum ratio.
We define T (AE,Y ) as the suggested annual re-
turns target (target ratio) of subsidiary e = E in year
y = Y , and Tn(AE,Y ) as the normalized target. As tar-
gets are unknown (to us) but business developments are
rather stable over the years, we estimate the target ratio
in y = Y by averaging the December ratios of the three
preceding years. Finally, we define the last revision for
ratios 12Rn = Rn(1F ) − Rn(2F ), and the difference
from target with TargetDiff = Tn(A) − Rn(1F ).
For reasons of clarity: ratios and ratio revisions are
neither stored in the database nor are they forecasted
or adjusted directly. Ratios are computed from the cash
flow items by us using (1).
4.2. Revision analyses
We expect a dependency of the target ratio
(Tn(A)) and revision (12Rn) together with a decrease
of adjustments when approaching a suggested target
ratio with a currently forecasted ratio. A schematic















Figure 2: Hypothesized relationship between the
magnitude of revision within the fiscal year.
Suggesting an accountant within a legal subsidiary
to aim at achieving a pre–defined EBITDA, which
strictly relates to a cumulated ratio of cash inflows and
cash outflows, the magnitude of changes in ratio as a
result of cash flow revisioning should increase with the
distance to a presumed target. As we assume the target
ratio to be met at the end–of–year, the difference from
target should decline over the months of the year.
To test this relationship, we regress the magnitude
of 12Rn on TargetDiff together with the actual month
within a fiscal year (Month). Regression outcomes
are shown in Table 2. The outcome shows that an
expert’s revisioning can indeed be partly explained by
TargetDiff and Month . Changes in forecast ratios
through a revisioning of cash flows increases with
TargetDiff (the higher the distance of a forecasted ratio
to the presumed target ratio, the higher the adjustments
of the ratio through revisioning), and declines when
approaching the end of a fiscal year. The significance
of both estimates is surprising (∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; number of observations: 2,355), as this
means that the magnitude of the final revisions of cash
flows, at the aggregated ratio level, is predictable to
some extend.
Table 2: Outcomes when regressing absolute change in
forecast ratio through absolute difference from target
and month.
Dep. Variables for |12Rn| Estimates
| TargetDiff | 0.085 ∗∗∗
Month − 0.005 ∗∗∗
Constant 0.184 ∗∗∗
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In order to operationalize these dependencies to
improve cash flow prediction, we need to derive the
direction of the final change in the forecasted ra-
tio. Therefore, we regress 12Rn on the strength of
TargetDiff and Month . Table 3 shows the result of the
regression with significance levels (∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01; number of observations: 2,355).
Table 3: Results when regressing the revision of the
forecasted ratio on the magnitude of difference from
target and month.
Dep. Variables for 12Rn Estimates
| TargetDiff | 0.054 ∗∗
Month − 0.004 ∗∗∗
Constant 0.025 ∗
Results indicate that revision at the ratio level
is significantly positively related to the magnitude of
difference from target, indicating that forecasted ratios
increase through the final revisioning cycle. The higher
the absolute distance from Tn(A), the more the cash
flow forecasts (Rn(1F )) are adjusted to increase the
ratio. In addition, over the months in a year the last re-
vision (12Rn) decreases the forecasted ratio (Rn(1F )).
These results hint at experts adjusting their cash flows
in a way to reach a position above Tn(A). Fore-
casted ratios below Tn(A) are revised upwards, with
adjustments getting smaller when approaching Tn(A).
Considering the negative estimate of Month , this leads
to approaching Tn(A) towards the end of a year.
However, the interpretation of the regression out-
comes when a forecasted ratio is already above the
suggested target is challenging. Therefore, we analyze
how forecasted ratios are revised when suggested tar-
gets are already reached with the forecast compared to
forecasts that are below target. With Sign(TargetDiff )
as binary variable indicating whether Rn(1F ) is above
or below the suggested target Tn(A), we regress the
final revision 12Rn on Sign(TargetDiff ). Regression
results are shown in Table 4. The significance of the
negative estimate indicates that Rn(1F ) decrease when
Tn(A) is already met and increased when Rn(1F ) is
below Tn(A) (∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; number
of observations: 2,355).
Table 4: Results when regressing the last ratio revision
on Sign(TargetDiff).
Dep. Variables for 12Rn Estimate
Sign(TargetDiff) −0.081∗∗∗
4.3. Summary and discussion
Overall, these results show that forecasting pro-
cesses do not describe random walks and provide strong
indication that cash flow ratios are adjusted to converge
to predefined target ratios. The difference of the fore-
cast to this target turns out to be a strong predictor for
subsequent revision direction and volume. This allows
for anticipating the final revision and therefore the
upcoming expert forecasts to some extend. Knowledge
of how forecasts will be adjusted later on by experts
allows improving longer–term forecasts, considering
that forecast accuracy overall increases with decreasing
lead time. For instance, we can model the last revision
12R
n at t = 2 and therefore partially anticipate the
final forecast Rn(1F ) in advance.
Therefore, the answer for the research question is
that strategic targets can explain judgmental revision-
ing, which rejects the expected random walk behavior.
The answer is in line with the results of [19], [26],
while our results point out the avoidance of negative
target surprises (as a threshold for the organizational
bias of earnings margin) for company internal cash
flows. However, our results extend their perspective as
we can analyze forecasts with different lead times and
relate the revision to the threshold. We assume that
the results were influenced by various organizational
effects, such as for instance noted in [27] or [23].
Overall, we assume managed earnings to be causal for
our results, which materializes in the presented target.
The results are expected to be valid for the over
200 other entities of the corporation. These entities
possess similar business structures, but mainly differ in
entity-size (have smaller transactions when measured
in Euro equivalent volumes) and the availability of the
data. We and the managers of the finance department
are confident that the results are transferable to differ-
ent companies and with a likewise business structure,
earnings management, and strategic targets.
5. Conclusions and outlook
We analyzed empirical cash flow forecast data of
a large multinational corporation and provide the first
study on patterns in cash flow forecast revisioning
processes related to management targets. The analyses
reveal predictable patterns of how the ratios of cumu-
lated cash inflows and cash outflows are adjusted over
time. The results hint to accountants’ targets related to
EBITDA that pave the way how actuals are adjusted
over the year, and, as a consequence, how forecasts are
revised.
From a managerial perspective, our results provide
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new insights and implications for the services of corpo-
rate financial controlling. One the one hand, the found
pattern can lead to automated correction of longer–term
forecasts by anticipation upcoming revision behavior of
experts. On the other hand, probably a more interesting
question might be why experts do not consider the
upcoming revisioning earlier in a forecasting process,
as their adjustments can—to some extend—be antic-
ipated by statistical means. One potential explanation
might be that these adjustments are not strictly related
to the operational business figures and developments
the experts should use for their forecasts. Changes in
actuals can also be related to accountants’ earnings
management activities to meet pre–defined EBITDA,
and experts might be not fully aware of these targets
and earnings management activities. It should be noted
that forecasters are encouraged to derive independent
prediction that are not aligned with the local controller.
However, these findings underpin the necessity to a
better understanding of the interplay of organizational
structures and forecasting processes to provide an accu-
rate, and a reliable financial system within a company.
Despite the potential causes for the predictabil-
ity of the cash flow forecasts at the cumulated ratio
level, our results indicate huge potentials for improving
longer–term cash flow forecasts and corporate risk
assessment that uses the forecast data in the financial
system. For instance, for companies operating in two
currencies only, corrections at the ratio level are directly
related to corrections of foreign exchange exposure,
where considering the upcoming adjustments within the
financial services would directly allow for improving
overall exposure forecasts to reduce either unhedged
risks or hedgingcosts.
6. References
[1] J. D. Martin and G. E. Morgan, “Financial Planning
Where the Firm’s Demand for Funds is Nonstationary and
Stochastic,” Management Science, vol. 34, no. 9, 1988, pp.
1054–1066.
[2] R. M. Stulz, “Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financ-
ing Policies,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 26, no. 1,
1990, pp. 3–27.
[3] C. Kim, D. Mauer, and A. Sherman, “The Determinants
of Corporate Liquidity: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 33, no. 3, 1998, pp.
335–359.
[4] J. R. Graham and C. R. Harvey, “The Theory and Practice
of Corporate Finance: Evidence from the Field,” Journal of
Financial Economics, vol. 60, no. 2, 2001, pp. 187–243.
[5] H. Almeida, M. Campello, and M. S. Weisbach,
“The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash,” Journal of Finance,
vol. 59, no. 4, 2004, pp. 1777–1804. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00679.x
[6] S. S. Lim and H. Wang, “The Effect of Financial Hedging
on the Incentives for Corporate Diversification: The Role of
Stakeholder Firm-Specific Investments,” Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, vol. 62, no. 4, 2007, pp. 640–656.
[7] W. D. Nordhaus, “Forecasting Efficiency: Concepts and
Applications,” The Review of Economics and Statistics,
vol. 69, no. 4, 1987, pp. 667–674.
[8] M. Lawrence and M. O’Connor, “Sales Forecasting
Updates: How Good are They in Practice?” International
Journal of Forecasting, vol. 16, no. 3, 2000, pp. 369–
382. [Online]. Available: http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/intfor/
v16y2000i3p369-382.html
[9] M. Ashiya, “Testing the Rationality of Japanese GDP
Forecasts: The Sign of Forecast Revision Matters,” Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 50, no. 2, 2003,
pp. 263–269.
[10] J. Dovern and J. Weisser, “Accuracy, Unbiasedness
and Efficiency of Professional Macroeconomic Forecasts:
An Empirical Comparison for the G7,” International
Journal of Forecasting, vol. 27, no. 2, 2011, pp. 452–
465. [Online]. Available: http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/intfor/
v27y2011i2p452-465.html
[11] B. Deschamps and C. Ioannidis, “Can Rational
Stubbornness Explain Forecast Biases?” Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, vol. 92, 2013, pp. 141–
151. [Online]. Available: http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/
v92y2013icp141-151.html
[12] L. A. Gordon and D. Miller, “A contingency framework
for the design of accounting information systems,” Account-
ing, Organizations and Society, vol. 1, no. 1, 1976, pp. 59–69.
[13] R. Fildes, P. Goodwin, and M. Lawrence, “The Design
Features of Forecasting Support Systems and Their Effective-
ness,” Decision Support Systems, vol. 42, no. 1, Oct. 2006,
pp. 351–361.
[14] J. Han, J. Pei, and M. Kamber, Data Mining: Concepts
and Techniques. Elsevier, 2011.
[15] F. Kno¨ll, V. Dorner, and T. Setzer, “Relating Cash
Flow Forecast Errors to Revision Patterns,” in Multikonferenz
Wirtschaftsinformatik (MKWI) 2016: Prescriptive Analytics
in IS, vol. 2. Universita¨tsverlag Ilmenau, 2016, pp. 1217–
1228.
[16] B. Marr, Key Performance Indicators (KPI): The 75
Measures Every Manager Needs to Know. Pearson UK,
2012.
[17] N. D. Daniel, D. J. Denis, and L. Naveen, “Do Firms
Manage Earnings to Meet Dividend Thresholds?” Journal of
Accounting and Economics, vol. 45, no. 1, 2008, pp. 2–26.
[18] D. Bergstresser, M. Desai, and J. Rauh, “Earnings ma-
nipulation, pension assumptions, and managerial investment
Page 1588
decisions,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121,
no. 1, 2006, pp. 157–195.
[19] D. Burgstahler and M. Eames, “Management of Earn-
ings and Analysts’ Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small
Positive Earnings Surprises,” Journal of Business Finance &
Accounting, vol. 33, no. 5–6, 2006, pp. 633–652.
[20] F. Degeorge, J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser, “Earnings
Management to Exceed Thresholds,” Journal of Business,
vol. 72, no. 1, 1999, pp. 1–33. [Online]. Available:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/209601
[21] D. Burgstahler and I. Dichev, “Earnings Management to
Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses,” Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, vol. 24, no. 1, 1997, pp. 99–126.
[22] R. W. Holthausen, D. F. Larcker, and R. G. Sloan,
“Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings,”
Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 19, no. 1, 1995,
pp. 29–74.
[23] F. Guidry, A. J. Leone, and S. Rock, “Earnings-Based
Bonus Plans and Earnings Management by Business-Unit
Managers,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 26,
no. 1, 1999, pp. 113–142.
[24] P. M. Healy, “The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Account-
ing Decisions,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 7,
no. 1-3, 1985, pp. 85–107.
[25] F. Kno¨ll and V. Simko, “Organizational Information
improves Forecast Efficiency of Correction Techniques,” in
Proceedings of the 17th Conference Information Technologies
– Applications and Theory (ITAT), Computational Intelli-
gence and Data Mining (WCIDM 2017), vol. 1885, 2017.
[26] J. Jacob and B. N. Jorgensen, “Earnings Management
and Accounting Income Aggregation,” Journal of Accounting
and Economics, vol. 43, no. 2, 2007, pp. 369–390.
[27] S. Roychowdhury, “Earnings Management Through
Real Activities Manipulation,” Journal of Accounting and
Economics, vol. 42, no. 3, 2006, pp. 335–370.
Page 1589
